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I examine how state government transparency initiatives impact state performance. Specifically, I 
examine how variation in state spending transparency impacts state expenditure efficiency, 
expenditure responsiveness, and solvency. Transparency is often touted in contemporary society 
as an exemplary governance tool and an essential ingredient in resolving agency conflicts. Greater 
transparency in government is said to foster more public accountability and more efficient use of 
scarce taxpayer dollars. However, transparency also motivates short-termism, “you-get-what-you-
measure” phenomena, and selective accountability to vocal or majority constituents. Utilizing state 
transparency initiatives and third party assessments of state expenditure transparency websites I 
am able to identify variations in state-level transparency efforts. I find that more transparent states 
are more efficient (e.g., lower expenditures per capita) and more responsive to constituents (e.g., 
higher expenditures on voter priorities), but there are discernable pitfalls. For example, I find that 
more transparent states are selectively responsive based on party affiliation and favor current 
performance at the expense of long-term solvency. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
Transparency is often touted in contemporary society as an exemplary governance tool 
and an essential ingredient in resolving agency conflicts. Transparency is a broad term used to 
describe the relative accessibility and availability of information. In the context of governance, 
transparency is operating in such a way that it is easy for others to see what actions are 
performed (Elert, Henrekson, & Sanders 2019). For governments, greater transparency is said to 
foster more public accountability and more efficient use of scarce taxpayer dollars (Cucciniello 
et al. 2017; La Porta et al. 1999). Skeptics, on the other hand, focus on the pitfalls of 
transparency and question whether the increased flow of information is meaningfully actionable 
(Bannister and Connolly 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen 2012; de Fine Licht 2011). In this paper, I use 
the expenditure transparency initiatives of state governments to assess the promise and pitfalls of 
state reporting transparency. 
State governments collectively spent $2.3 trillion and employed 5.4 million people in 
2017.1 Despite established control mechanisms and reporting processes, public concerns over 
wasteful or inappropriate spending are common, with a 2009 Gallup poll finding that on average, 
Americans believe 42 cents of every dollar spent by state governments is wasteful. Proponents of 
greater government transparency suggest that revelation of expenditure details and spending 
processes allows for increased taxpayer monitoring and scrutiny, leading to better decisions by 
                                                 
 
1 According to the 2017 U.S. Census of Governments. 
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political agents and ultimately higher quality government.2 This is in line with studies in 
corporate settings, where calls for transparency usually invoke agency-theoretic arguments that 
more or better financial information makes informed insiders more accountable to external 
stakeholders (Barth et al. 2013; Glassman 2002; Holmstrom 1979).  
Transparency in state governments, however, is not a panacea. For instance, a prominent 
concern in governmental settings is that citizens are not sufficiently sophisticated to understand 
and process the information disclosed via various transparency initiatives (Bannister and 
Connolly 2012; Naurin and Fellow 2006; Fenster 2006). The agency literature also suggests that, 
in some settings, transparency contributes to contracting inefficiencies; e.g., by precluding 
longer-term contractual commitments, motivating short-termism, or promoting “you-get-what-
you-measure” types of phenomena. For example, if decision-makers are accountable for their 
transparent actions but not for the consequences of all their decisions, then decision-makers will 
conform to their expected actions with less regard for overall organizational efficiency (e.g., Prat 
2005). Yet another pitfall in governmental settings holds that transparency motivates selective 
accountability in the sense that decisions favor the interests of vocal or majority constituents 
rather than the interests of the public as a whole. For instance, Maskin and Tirole (2004) suggest 
that making government officials more accountable to voters motivates pandering to majority 
public opinion, again with little regard for overall performance. 
In this paper, I test how transparency relates to state government performance. I first 
consider the promise of transparency; the association between state government performance and 
state expenditure transparency initiatives. For constituents interested in specific policy initiatives 




(education, health, etc.), government performance is often judged by its ability to deliver specific 
policy outcomes (Afonso et al. 2005; Tanzi and Schuknect 1997; 2000). At a more aggregate 
level, the political science and political economy literatures suggest three distinct constructs of 
overall performance: efficiency, responsiveness to constituents, and effectiveness in successfully 
implementing government policies (Kosack and Fung 2014; La Porta et al. 1999; Piotrowski 
2008; Shah 2005). For example, Shah (2005) proposes efficiency, “providing services of a given 
quality in the least-cost manner,” and responsiveness, “providing services consistent with citizen 
preferences.” While La Porta et al (1999) propose efficiency, government output relative to 
input, and effectiveness, the degree of successful policy implementation. 
Following this literature, I adopt state government expenditure “efficiency” and 
expenditure “responsiveness” as distinct constructs of state performance.3 I measure expenditure 
efficiency in two ways: expenditures per capita and expenditure as a percentage of state GDP 
(see also Hauner and Kyobe 2008; Hauner 2008; Afonso and Fernandes 2007).4 I measure 
expenditure responsiveness as the interaction of spending ratios and voter priorities. Spending 
ratios compare spending by category or service area (e.g., education, healthcare, public 
assistance) to total general expenditures. Voter priorities are captured through annual Pew 
Research Center polls. This interaction captures the allocation each category of state spending 
receives of total general funds and its implied importance to voters. A more responsive 
                                                 
 
3 To address any concerns over the measures selected, I also consider stewardship as an alternate measure of state 
performance. Cuny, Kim, and Mehta (2020), define stewardship as “the proper oversight and use of public funds”.  
4 Government efficiency has been measured in various ways in the political science and public policy literatures. 
The primary focus of these measures is on socio-economic indicators that are presumed to be the target of 
government spending (infant mortality, elementary education enrollment rates, etc.). However, these measures do 
not address overall government spending, but only highly specific areas of spending. Hauner and Kyobe (2008) 
create a large cross-country panel dataset and find that expenditure relative to GDP is associated with lower 
efficiency across sectors. 
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government would therefore be one that allocates a higher percentage of resources to areas of 
greater voter priority. 
Currently, all state governments have transparency initiatives whereby expenditure 
information is made publicly available online.5 Each state operates its own spending website that 
varies as to the information’s granularity, searchability, and completeness. This state-level 
variation in transparency allows for an organization-level study as opposed to the standard 
approach in prior literature which measures transparency at the country level.6 I measure a state 
government’s transparency in two ways. First, for 2006-2016, I assess transparency as a binary 
decision, i.e., whether the states provided spending information publicly online in a given year or 
they did not. Second, for 2010-2016, I use transparency scores from annual assessments of state 
spending transparency websites provided by the United States Public Interest Research Group 
(PIRG) and the Frontier Group. The assessments, known as the “Following the Money” Reports, 
score [on a scale of 0-100] states on the detail and completeness of spending transparency. Based 
on these scores, states are also separated by performance, labeled as “leading” [score of 80-100], 
“middling” [score of 50-79], etc. 
I find that more transparent states are more efficient with their expenditures. For 
example, I find that states receiving a “passing” score [score of 50-100] spend $1,089 less per 
capita than states receiving a “failing” score [score of 0-49]. Among those states receiving a 
passing grade, there is also some evidence that states labeled as leading were more efficient than 
                                                 
 
5 States began disclosing spending-related information online as early as the 1990’s, but the majority of the 
transparency websites became available between the mid 2000’s and mid 2010’s. 
6 For example, Bushman et al. (2004) and Lang and Maffet (2011a, 2011b) measure transparency based on the 
regulatory and institutional environments of a nation. An exception is Barth et al. (2013) which measures firm-level 
transparency based on the explanatory power of the relation between a firm’s returns and its earnings. 
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other states. For example, leading states’ expenditure as a percent of GDP is two percentage 
points lower compared to failing states; a difference that is 14.2% of the sample mean. I also find 
that transparent states’ expenditure allocation decisions are responsive to voter priorities of a 
given year. In particular, more transparent states have higher (lower) allocations [as a percent of 
general state expenditure] for spending categories that voters deem high (low) priority. For 
example, a ten point increase in a state’s PIRG score is associated with a -0.14 percentage point 
difference in total general state expenditure allocated to categories of high voter priority; a 
difference of $59.1 million at the sample mean. Moreover, I find that these results prevail for the 
individual categories of state expenditures.7 Altogether, my findings support that transparent 
states are responsive to voters. 
While these results suggest that transparency has promise for state performance, it does 
not mean increased transparency is without its pitfalls. As noted earlier, there is literature 
suggesting that transparency motivates short-termism, “you-get-what-you-measure” phenomena, 
or selective accountability to vocal or majority constituents. I consider these unintentional 
consequences in two ways. First, to assess selective accountability, I find evidence that 
transparent states with Republican (Democratic) governors are more responsive to Republican 
(Democratic) voter priorities. Second, to assess how transparency affects short versus long-term 
decision making, I use solvency measures as indicators of how a state’s short-term focus can be 
counterproductive.8 In brief, I find that transparent states are less solvent with the effect most 
                                                 
 
7 As opposed to pooled by high and low priority. 
8 Solvency is measured in three ways. Two are traditional measure of state government solvency, net asset ratio and 
long term liability ratio, as captured by the Mercatus Group. The third is a measure of the impact of unfunded 
pension liabilities on state solvency per capita established by Truth in Accounting (TIA).  
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evident in states graded as “leading” in transparency. For example, compared to failing states, 
leading states exhibit an $8,009 larger deficit per capita, nearly double the sample mean. 
My study is subject to a number of limitations and caveats, which I acknowledge and 
address in the paper. One caveat of particular importance is the threat of reverse causality. It is 
possible that more efficient or responsive states are more likely to be transparent due to some 
perceived benefit of signaling these qualities. To address this concern, I consider both the other 
possible motivators for implementing a transparency initiative, as well as more direct tests of 
how efficiency influences transparency initiative implementations. I do not find any evidence to 
support reverse causality. Another limitation of note is that I rely on transparency scores 
developed by the PIRG. As an alternative, I use an independent assessment of county 
transparency developed by the Sunshine Review. Evidence from supplementary analyses with 
this alternative sample confirm my findings. 
Overall, my results suggest that transparency has promise and improves state 
performance, measured as efficiency and responsiveness to voters, but there are discernable 
pitfalls. First, more transparent states are selectively accountable to specific constituents. Second, 
consistent with literature that documents how disclosure exacerbates myopic decision-making in 
corporate settings (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal 2005; Brochet, Loumioti, & Serafeim 2015; 
Ernstberger et al. 2017), I find that transparent states shortchange long-term success.  
My findings also contribute to the public policy literature concerned with the 
effectiveness of transparency in government. There is a long-standing assumption that increasing 
transparency will improve the quality of government (Cucciniello et al. 2017). However, recent 
studies question this assumption by suggesting that government transparency has exacerbated 
polarization in public discourse (Grumet 2014). While the political ramifications of transparency 
 7 
is beyond the scope of this paper, my results suggest that state transparency initiatives 
implemented over the last decade have had real economic consequences. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses background and 
conceptual underpinnings. Section 3 details the data. Section 4 describes research design and 
empirical results. Section 5 discusses the alternative sample, while Section 6 concludes. 
 8 
Chapter 2 Institutional Background and Conceptual Underpinnings 
 
2.1 State Government Operations and Budgets 
In many ways, state governments operate like any other organization. Endowed with 
resources, state governments perform established sets of activities for the benefit of their 
stakeholders. State governments pick up where the federal government leaves off, but often with 
more complex constitutions and more daily contact with citizens than their federal counterpart. 
State responsibilities include the education of residents, public aid and safety, justice systems, 
public health, maintenance of state highways and administration of local roads, setting up local 
governments, and more. These functions include differing levels of input and cooperation from 
federal and local governments, but are ultimately the responsibility of the individual states. As a 
result, all fifty states engage in a similar set of activities and under the same guidance from the 
federal government. 
States follow a relatively uniform budgeting process (Wallin 1998). The fiscal year in 
most states runs from July 1st through June 30th. The process begins in July or August when a 
state’s budget office sends out requests for input from individual departments and agencies. 
These requests often include a questionnaire sent out to each agency or department with the 
budget office’s expected range of resources to be allocated. The questionnaires are completed, 
compiled by the budget office, and a proposed budget is assembled by the executive branch. The 
budget moves to an appropriations committee, and then eventually on to the two houses of the 
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legislature, before returning to the executive branch for approval.9 Each step involves edits and 
negotiations, which can include last-minute line item vetoes from the governor’s office, before 
the final budget is approved. This process is consistent across states, with some variation in the 
composition of the appropriations committee, the use of super majorities to overrule standard 
practices, and the exact extent of executive powers (Wallin 1998). Possibly the largest difference 
in budgeting practices among states is that 21 states opt for a biennial process in the hopes of 
allowing for more floor time on non-budget matters. The state budget process, while at times 
viewed as tedious, is similar and yet more streamlined compared to its federal equivalent.10 
The state budget process is typically incremental. Discussions often focus on changes 
from the prior budget, often the removal or creation of line items. As a result, established 
spending levels rarely change. Attempts at comprehensive budget reform have been historically 
unsuccessful (National Conference of State Legislatures 1995). The most common restriction on 
state government budgets is that they be balanced. Currently, all states except Vermont require a 
balanced budget in some form.11 While balanced budget requirements vary in their 
implementation, prior literature shows that balanced budget restrictions are associated with 
increased tax revenue and reduced spending, as well as a reallocation of assets and the movement 
of revenue among funds that are and are not subject to balanced budget requirements (Alt and 
Lowery 1994; Poterba 1994, 1996; Bohn and Inman 1996, Costello et al 2017). 
                                                 
 
9 Note that Nebraska has a unicameral legislature and therefore the budget is reviewed by the single legislative body. 
10 The federal process requires movement through 15 different committees (and their sub-committees) as opposed to 
the single appropriations committee approach at the state level. 
11 States have varied in their balanced budget requirements, with every state requiring balanced budgets at some 
point in the last 10 years, including Vermont. 
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Overall, the state budget process acts as a control mechanism and is arguably the largest 
influence on actual state spending. State spending (and government spending in general) is also 
scrutinized by outsiders. As noted earlier, public concerns over wasteful or inappropriate 
spending are common (Gallup 2009). Transparency is suggested as a solution to these concerns, 
as it increases taxpayers’ and other outsiders’ ability to monitor and scrutinize government 
spending. For instance, the U.S. Public Interest Group, in their first report on state spending 
transparency in 2010, state: “The ability to see how government uses the public purse is 
fundamental to democracy. Spending transparency checks corruption, bolsters public confidence 
in government, and promotes fiscal responsibility.” 
Currently, all 50 states operate its own website dedicated to spending transparency. States 
vary as to how the websites were introduced and implemented. The majority of states [36 out of 
50] initiated transparency websites between 2008 and 2010. This was likely heavily influenced 
by the 2008 Senate Bill 3077 that focused on providing more information on government 
spending and sponsored by the then likely Democratic and Republican nominees for president, 
Senators Barack Obama and John McCain, respectively. The bipartisan support of the federal bill 
was largely reflected at the state level as well. While the state transparency initiatives were 
implemented by legislation, executive order, or direct action of the state comptroller or treasurer, 
there was also largely bipartisan support across states.12 States were likely also influenced in 
starting a transparency initiative by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 
2009, which requires states to track federal stimulus funds. While tracking stimulus funds would 
                                                 
 
12 I hand check the nature of implementation for all 50 states and noted the political affiliation of those sponsoring 
the new transparency system to confirm the states.  
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not require checkbook level detail, states like Minnesota note the need to track federal stimulus 
spending as the kicking off point for a discussion on greater spending transparency.13 
In addition to the when and how of implementation, these websites vary in granularity, 
searchability, and completeness of information made available to the public both through time 
and among states. For example, the states of Washington and Alaska both created a transparency 
website in 2008. By 2010 the state of Washington only provided spending information 
aggregated at the agency level for the year. In comparison, Alaska provided more detailed 
checkbook level information in 2010, though it was not searchable. By 2016, Washington 
modified its website to be more interactive, allowing for users to select the level of spending 
information they would like to see. Alaska’s website did not change between 2010 and 2016, and 
even regressed as to how often the website was updated with timely information. Meanwhile, the 
state of Iowa did not create a transparency website until 2012, but by 2016 the website had 
superior search function to both Washington and Alaska, allowing users to search by department, 
program, vendor, or expense category.  See Appendix B for some examples of these state 
transparency websites from across the sample period.  
2.2 Transparency and State Government Performance 
 Although the definition of transparency has evolved over time, the idea that transparency 
promotes good government is not a new concept. Rousseau and other notable French 18th century 
revolutionaries were the first to talk about “visibility” and “openness” as a way of governing. 
The more contemporary definition of transparency has closer ties in history to the sentiments laid 
out by Louis Brandeis in 1913: “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the 
                                                 
 
13 https://mn.gov/mmb/transparency-mn/mat.jsp  
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most efficient policeman." However, it was not until the 1990’s that the term “transparency” was 
thought of as a synonym for good governance (Hood 2006).14  
As noted in the introduction, calls for transparency usually invoke agency-theoretic 
arguments that better or more frequent financial and non-financial disclosures improve the 
agency relationship. The promise of transparency, however, may not be realized if the 
information released through transparency initiatives is not understandable, easily processed, or 
digestible. Concerns about understandability is particularly salient in government settings 
because the promise of improved agency relationships is based on the assumption that citizen-
principals who receive state budget and expenditure information released by state governments 
are sufficiently sophisticated to properly process the information. And, even if the information is 
processed, there is a presumption that citizens will act on the information reasonably, free from 
various cognitive biases (Etzioni 2010; 2014). 
More generally, the promise of transparency may not be realized because transparency 
entails a number of pitfalls. One conventional pitfall holds that greater transparency (by a 
corporation or a government) also informs competing third parties who exploit the information to 
their advantage.15 A second pitfall revolves around the idea that transparency (e.g., via better and 
more frequent information) exacerbates agency conflicts because it discourages longer-term 
relationships between principals and agents (Laffont and Tirole 1993). Both pitfalls are 
significant in corporate settings but unlikely to be important in state government settings. Unlike 
                                                 
 
14 There are different explanations as to why transparency as a term experienced a rise in popularity starting in the 
1990s. The creation of Transparency International in the early 1990’s is likely one explanation. The rise of 
technology, the internet, and the ability to store and process large amounts of data were significant influences as 
well  (Birchall 2011; Margetts 2006)  
15 In corporate settings, this argument is labeled usually as the proprietary-cost hypothesis. In a similar vein, federal 
governments also may have cause for concern that transparency could present a national security threat. This 
concern does not apply to state governments. 
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corporations who may be reluctant to be transparent for, say, competitive reasons, state 
governments do not have outside competitors and thus are not concerned about how greater 
transparency informs competing third parties16. State governments are also not subject to 
elaborate contractual mechanisms (e.g., via market-based performance metrics) that govern their 
agency relationship with citizens, except periodically via voting. Hence, the idea that 
transparency limits contracting opportunities and exacerbates agency conflicts is unlikely to 
prevail in state government settings.  
 The political science and political economy literatures suggest three distinct performance 
constructs, efficiency, responsiveness to constituents, and effectiveness (Kosack and Fung 2014; 
La Porta et al. 1999; Piotrowski 2008; Shah 2005) that capture different dimensions of good 
government.  Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Shah (2005), I adopt efficiency as an 
important indicator of state government performance. A conventional definition of efficiency is 
to refer to the economical use of input resources relative a given level of output. This definition 
usually translates to a statement about the provision of governmental services of a given quality 
in the least-cost manner, or in some contexts, the reduction of waste, abuse, or fraud previously 
undetected. Thus, if state governments are transparent about their various expenditures and this 
improves their agency relationship with citizens, then I expect states will be more efficient in 
expending government resources.  
 In contrast to efficiency, which has an input focus, responsiveness to constituents and 
effectiveness are more outcome oriented performance indicators. La Porta et al (1999) define 
                                                 
 
16 It could be argued that states do have to compete for both companies and people to locate in their states. For 
companies, the incentive is usually tax motivated and therefore more transparency could reveal favorable tax 
incentives states have used for companies to locate there. However, as companies are fully informed on the offers 
made available to them, it is reasonable to believe that states are also aware of competing offers. 
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“effectiveness” as the degree of successful implementation of government policies. Shah (2005) 
promotes the notion of “responsiveness to constituents” to emphasize an explicit alignment with 
citizens’ priorities. These priorities usually include objectives far broader than concerns about 
efficiency. For instance, if citizens’ priorities call for more expenditures on education or 
infrastructure, then state governments that are more transparent about their specific expenditures 
in those categories allow citizens (principals) to better monitor government performance in 
relation to their objectives.  
Although the above argument assumes that responsiveness to constituents is a 
characteristic of good government, there are potential drawbacks. If transparency motivates 
“selective accountability” in the sense that decisions favor the interests of select constituents 
(some principals) rather than the interests of the organization as a whole, then transparency may 
be counterproductive. For instance, Maskin and Tirole (2004) suggest that making public 
officials too accountable motivates pandering to majority public opinion, with little regard for 
other constituents’ welfare.  
Similarly, agency theory suggests that if decision-makers are held accountable for their 
more visible and transparent actions but not for the performance consequences of all their 
decisions, then decision-makers will unduly focus on their expected actions with minimal regard 
for overall organizational efficiency (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Prat 2005). This 
implies that, in some circumstances, transparency exacerbates agency conflicts by motivating 
short-termism or promoting “you-get-what-you-measure” types of phenomena (Graham et al. 
2005; Brochet et al. 2015; Ernstberger et al. 2017). 
 15 
Chapter 3 Data, Measures, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1 Data and Variable Descriptions 
 The data for this study are taken from a variety of public government online sources, as 
well as hand collected from requested or published government and third party reports. 
3.1.1 Transparency 
For the purposes of this paper, transparency in the state government setting is defined as 
the level of information revealed around state spending. While states may engage in more than 
financial transparency, state spending is a clear revelation of actions, revealed with 
“transparency” in mind, and measurable. I measure the transparency of state government 
spending in two ways. The first is a binary measure of whether a state had a transparency 
initiative in a given year. I hand collect the implementation year for each state by carbon dating 
individual state transparency websites.17 I verify the implementation year through searches of 
news archives, state legislature records, and gubernatorial reports. Implemented is therefore a 
dichotomous variable set to one (1) if a state had a transparency initiative in the given year, and 
zero (0) otherwise. 
The second measure of transparency relies on variation in the execution of these 
websites. To assess state transparency efforts, I utilize third party assessments of each state’s 
                                                 
 
17 Carbon dating a website is a technique that systematically checks the first time a website appears or is indexed on 
other websites (including twitter, bitly, various web archives, Google, etc.). I use a tool made available by computer 
science researchers at Old Dominion University. Available here: http://carbondate.cs.odu.edu/ 
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transparency website completed by the Frontier Group and the United States Public Interest 
Research Group (PIRG). These “Following the Money” reports, published annually from 2010 to 
2016, grade each state on their spending transparency efforts.18 The grading of a state's 
transparency efforts are based on the level of detail and completeness of transparency, as well as 
the searchability of the information provided. Assessments are made through examination of the 
state’s available transparency resources and discussion with each state’s treasury office.  
The “Following the Money” reports evaluate states based on a defined methodology and 
assess each state a score on a scale of 0-100, captured as the continuous variable PIRG Score.19 
Based on these scores, states are separated into performance tiers. States are considered Leading 
with a grade of 80 or above. These states provide checkbook-level spending information with 
few restrictions, the ability to search and parse data, and easier access to download data. 
Middling states fall in the range of 50-79 points and provide some checkbook level detail, but 
may lack the searchability and/or breadth and depth of the information provided by those states 
in the Leading category. The combination of these two groups are considered Passing states [a 
grade of 50 points or higher]. All information from the PIRG reports are hand collected.  
The advantages of utilizing these third party reports as opposed to using a textual analysis 
process (e.g. “fog” or some similar metric) are twofold. First, the variation over time of these 
websites would be difficult to retroactively apply any measure consistently across all 50 states. 
The PIRG reports have the advantage of assessing state websites annually, along with directly 
interacting with those that oversee the websites from each state. Second, measures that are 
                                                 
 
18 The PIRG, faced with limited resources, and high investigation times and costs switched to a rotating schedule of 
assessment for states and only published “Following the Money” reports on state efforts every other year after 2016. 
19 Some late reports further break states into five categories as opposed to the original three. For consistency, I use 
the original three categories, being sure to use the same cutoff points in later years. 
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traditionally used for textual analysis would not match the type of information that states are 
sharing. Traditional textual analysis tools are often intended for the “readability” of text, as 
opposed to the availability or accessibility of information. These websites are often a public 
checkbook where payments are recorded with varying levels of detail depending on the state and 
year, making the assessment by the PIRG more relevant to measuring the availability or 
accessibility of information provided. Please see Appendix B for samples of the state websites. 
An important limitation of using state spending websites is that while the discussion of 
state spending transparency is centered on the importance of taxpayers being able to monitor and 
scrutinize government actions, it is not abundantly clear who is actually using these state 
spending websites. Some states make disclosures about website traffic to the PIRG or on their 
websites that make it clear the websites are being used, but overall it is unclear whether 
transparency websites are being viewed by voters or some other outsiders. For example, website 
traffic could be coming from coalitions, watchdog groups, or the press all looking for 
information for their own purposes as opposed to a concerned citizen attempting to monitor state 
actions. However, these alternative viewers indirectly fulfill a similar purpose, in that there is 
increased scrutiny on more detailed state spending information.  
3.1.2 State Government Performance 
Consistent with the political science literature, I capture state government performance 
across two constructs: expenditure efficiency and expenditure responsiveness. I measure a state 
government’s spending efficiency in two ways: Expenditure as % of GDP and Expenditure per 
Capita. Government spending efficiency has been measured in a number of ways depending 
upon the study and the data available. The focus though of these measure, as discussed 
previously, is governmental services of a given quality in the least-cost manner. In the public 
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policy and political science literatures, measures are usually based around a socio-economic 
indicator that is presumed to be the target of government spending (infant mortality, elementary 
education enrollment rates, etc.). However, these measures do not address overall government 
spending, but only highly specific areas of spending. 
I therefore follow Hauner and Kyobe (2008) who note the limitations of such measures 
and test a multitude of measures of government quality and output utilizing a large cross-country 
panel dataset. Their research finds that higher expenditure relative to GDP is associated with 
lower efficiency across sectors. I therefore, utilize Expenditure as % of GDP as a measure of 
overall state expenditure efficiency. To avoid reliance on a single metric, I also follow Afonso 
and Fernandes (2007) who find that lower per-capita expenditure levels (Expenditure per Capita) 
are associated with more efficient governments. These two measures relate government 
expenditure to measures of state fiscal health and wealth, a way to measure “bang for buck” of 
state expenditure.20 I collect data on state expenditures and populations from the U.S. Census 
Bureau Survey of the States and the Urban Institute. Data on GDP come from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. 
To measure responsiveness, I split state spending allocations between issues of high 
priority to the majority of voters and those that are not. I measure expenditure allocation as the 
ratio of state spending by service area to total direct expenditure. The separation of state 
spending by service is done in accordance with the government spending categories defined by 
the U.S. Census Bureau (education, healthcare, pension management, etc.).21 These ratios 
                                                 
 
20 A limitation to these aggregated measures is that individual states may provide different services and that using an 
overall expenditure figure loses some of that variation. 
21 There are variations in state spending categories, but I opt for the six-category method from the Census Bureau. 
The U.S. Census Bureau conducts an annual survey to capture comprehensive state and local government financial 
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capture how each state allocates funds amongst government activities each year. Data on service-
level spending is collected from the Urban Institute.22 To operationalize voter priorities, I hand-
collected annual polls by the Pew Research Group which ask individuals to identify which 
government issues are a high priority for them each year. Areas identified as “top priority” by 
more than 50% of voters polled are identified that year as a High Priority, a binary indicator 
variable. While the polls are not specific to state government, the issues polled do directly line up 
with the categories of state spending. Polls are not identified by geography, but are split by the 
political affiliation of the individual polled.  
Finally, in consideration of pitfalls, I use three measures of state solvency to proxy for 
long-term success. The first two measures are collected from annual assessments of state fiscal 
health performed by the Mercatus Center: Net Asset Ratio and Long-Term Liability Ratio. To 
measure the impact of unfunded pension liabilities, I utilize a report by Truth in Accounting 
(TIA) that considers whether a state can cover all of its liabilities, including unfunded pension 
liabilities. The measure breaks down what the per capita surplus or deficit of all state level 
obligations would be at the close of each fiscal year, captured as TIA Surplus per Capita. 
3.1.3 Controls and Other Measures 
While states engage in the same revenue and expenditure generating activities, there are 
still differences amongst the states that may influence my measures of performance. Data on 
state characteristics are pulled from the U.S. Census Bureau, the PEW Research Center, The 
                                                 
 
data. Data on revenue and expenditures are captured at a more granular level that using uniform definitions and 
procedures. This more granular data is then rolled up into the larger spending categories, making the manipulation of 
spending categories difficult. 
22 Urban Institute data is compiled from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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National Association of State Budget Offices (NASBO), the Mercatus Center, and the Urban 
Institute. Governor political affiliation data are hand collected from state election records. 
Further details on all of the above discussed measures can be found in Appendix A. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the main sample. The sample covers all fifty 
states over the period 2006-2016 in Panel A and 2010-2016 in Panel B. The varying sample 
lengths allow for greater variation in the binary Implemented variable as opposed to limiting to 
only the years with PIRG data availability. There is variation in the asset endowment, 
population, and personal income levels of the states, with the tails being relatively widespread. 
“Larger” states like California, Texas, and New York consistently fall at the maximum values 
across the board, while “smaller” states like Vermont, Wyoming, and the Dakotas often fall at 
the low ends.  
However, the same is not true for measures of efficiency and expenditure ratios which 
display greater variation within the states over time. For the 2010-2016 (2006-2016) sample, the 
mean Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP is 13.72% (13.44%). Expenditure per Capita ranges 
from $4,109 ($3,710) at the low end up to $17,631 ($17,631) at the high end. While some states 
fall consistently at the tails of these distributions, it is not consistent across measures. For 
example, Alaska often falls at the low ends of efficiency measures, but the tails for these 
measures is not consistently only the “smallest” states.  
The ratio of specific expenditure categories to total general expenditure ranges across 
states. However, education and public assistance spending consistently fall at the top of the 
spending priority list with averages of 19.07% (19.33%) and 30.44% (29.73%) of total general 
spending, respectively. At the other end are spending on public safety with an average of 3.034% 
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(3.975%) of general spending and public works and housing spending with 3.754% (3.207%) of 
general spending. 
Transparency also ranges for the available sample. While 94.9% of state years have a 
transparency initiative in the 2010-2016 sample, that drops to 70.18% in the larger sample from 
2006-2016. It is the variation in the assessed effort of these initiatives presented in Panel B of 
Table 1 that has the greater variation. States are assessed as Leading 42.3% of the time and 
Middling 43.7% of the time.  
Table 2 includes detail on the breakdown of how states are categorized across the years 
between the Leading, Middling, and Lagging categories, as well as the year that the state initiated 
transparency efforts. Some states consistently fall in the Leading category, such as Kentucky and 
Texas. Others fall frequently in the Lagging category such as Idaho, one of the last states to 
implement a transparency website. States that fall into multiple categories do not always follow a 
monotonic path through the categories. For example, Hawaii mainly falls into the Middling 
category, but fell into the Lagging category in 2013 due to outdated information systems. 
Table 3 summarizes voter priorities. Panel A captures preferences for the period 2006-
2016, while Panel B is 2010-2016. Voter priorities are matched to their relevant state expenditure 
category and broken down by political party as well. Education and Healthcare are both 
consistently a “Top Priority” to voters. 
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Chapter 4 Research Design and Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Transparency and Efficiency 
 To assess the relation of transparency and efficiency, I examine the relation between 
state transparency effort and expenditure efficiency using the following regression: 
 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  +  ℎ𝑗,𝑡  +  𝑗,𝑡 (1) 
where the dependent variable, 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡, is one of the two efficiency measures previously 
identified in Section 3 for state i in year t: Expenditure as % of GDP or Expenditure per Capita. 
The independent variable of interest is 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡, which captures: the binary measure 
Implemented, the continuous measure PIRG Score, or categorical variables that partition 
transparency initiatives into Leading [PIRG Score of 80 to 100] and Middling [PIRG Score of 50 
to 79].  
A vector of state level controls are represented by 𝑋𝑖,𝑡. Total Assets captures the assets of 
the state for that year and Population is the state's total population in a given year. Personal 
Income captures the total income of state residents and is a measure of the economic well-being 
of a state's residents. Republican is an indicator as to whether the current governor in a state is a 
Republican or not. Over 65 and School Aged capture the ratio of the state’s population that are 65 
years old or older and aged five to eighteen, respectively. Finally, Poverty captures what portion 
of the state falls at or below the poverty line. In addition, ℎ𝑗,𝑡 captures Bureau of Economic 
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Analysis (BEA) region-year fixed effects to address concerns about regional shocks or time 
trends.23 Standard errors are also clustered by BEA region and year. 
Table 4 presents the regression results for Equation (1) examining if states that engage in 
transparency experience higher levels of efficiency. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽. A negative 𝛽 
coefficient (i.e., a lower level of expenditure to achieve the same level of GDP or lower 
expenditure per capita) indicates greater efficiency in states with transparency initiatives or 
greater transparency effort. The results in Table 4 suggest that only those states that excel in their 
transparency efforts exhibit greater levels of efficiency. 
The coefficient on Implemented in columns (1) and (4) is negative, but not significant. 
This result indicates that the existence of a transparency initiative alone does not impact state 
expenditure efficiency. The coefficients on PIRG Score in columns (2) and (5) indicate that 
states with greater levels of transparency also have greater levels of efficiency. A one point 
increase in PIRG Score is associated with a 2.67 basis points decrease in Expenditure as % of 
GDP. To achieve a 2.67 basis point decrease in Expenditure as % of GDP, a state at the mean of 
my sample would have to decrease spending by over $10.8M or increase GDP by $578.7M to 
achieve that result, or some combination there between. A one point increase in PIRG Score is 
significantly associated with a $17.05 decrease in Expenditure per Capita. These results 
indicated that more transparent states are incrementally more efficient. 
Instead of measuring transparency as a dichotomous or continuous variable, in columns 
(3) and (6) I use the categorical measures of transparency, Leading and Middling. The negative 
and significant coefficients on Leading suggest that, relative to failing states [a score below 50 
                                                 
 
23 There are seven total BEA regions: New England, the Mideast, the Southeast, the Great Lakes, the Plains, Rocky 
Mountain, the Southwest, and the Far West. 
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out of 100], those states assessed as the most transparent have greater levels of efficiency. 
Middling is also negative for both measures of efficiency, but only significant for Expenditure 
per Capita. These results suggest there is a degree of monotonicity and that my results are 
primarily driven by Leading states.  
Overall, Table 4 supports that increased levels of transparency are associated with better 
efficiency outcomes, but that there is some minimum level of effort required to see these 
benefits. 
4.2 Transparency and Responsiveness 
 To assess the relation of transparency and responsiveness, I examine the relation 
between state transparency effort and expenditure responsiveness using the following regression: 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + ℎ𝑐,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑗,𝑡 (2) 
where the dependent variable, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑐,𝑖,𝑡, is the share each area of state 
spending, c, is allocated as a percent of general direct expenditure identified for state i in year t. 
State spending is split into six major areas of spending: Education, Public Assistance, 
Healthcare, Public Safety, Transportation, and Public Works & Housing. Equation (2) is 
estimated using a pooled sample with 6 observations per state year. To assess responsiveness, I 
partition the sample between spending areas of high and low priority. By allowing an 
observation per spending category per state-year, each area of spending can be considered in 
comparison to its Priority to voters. See details on voter priorities in Table 3.  
A vector of state level controls are again represented by 𝑋𝑖,𝑡. In this specification, ℎ𝑐,𝑗,𝑡 
captures fixed effects by spending category within Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) region-
years. By using fixed effects at the category-region-year level, I can assess how abnormal levels 
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of a category within a region year are associated with transparency variation. Standard errors are 
again clustered by BEA region and year. 
Table 5 presents the regression results for Equation (2) examining if states with greater 
transparency effort are associated with expenditure allocation that is more responsive to voter 
priorities. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽. A positive (negative) 𝛽 coefficient indicates 
transparent states allocate more (less) of their expenditures to spending categories. Spending 
categories of high priority are presented in columns (1) through (3), while those of low priority 
are presented in columns (4) through (6). The results in Table 5 suggest that those states that 
excel in their transparency efforts exhibit both greater expenditure allocation to areas of high 
priority to voters, but also less allocation to areas of low priority to voters. 
The coefficient on Implemented in columns (1) and (4) are not significant, indicating that 
the existence of a transparency initiative is not significantly associated with my measure of 
responsiveness. The coefficients on PIRG Score in column (2) and (5) indicate that states with 
greater levels of transparency allocate more of their total expenditures to areas of high priority 
and less to areas of low priority than less transparent states. A one point increase in PIRG Score 
is associated with a 1.01 basis point increase in spending allocated to high priority categories and 
a 1.19 basis point decrease in the proportion of low priority spending. At the mean, this implies 
spending $3.1M more on areas of high priority and $3.7M less on low priority areas. 
Results for the categorical measures of transparency, Leading and Middling are 
comparable, with leading states displaying the greatest (lowest) allocation of spending to areas of 
high (low) priority. The positive and significant coefficients on Leading suggest that, relative to 
failing states, those states assessed as the most transparent allocate more (less) of general 
expenditure to those areas of highest (lowest) priority to voters. Middling is also positive 
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(negative) and significant for spending categories of high (low) priority. These results again 
suggest that there is a degree of monotonicity; Leading states allocate 0.814% more of general 
expenditures to areas of high priority compared to non-passing states, a difference of $252M at 
the sample mean.  
In Table 6, I disaggregate expenditure allocations to show where and how state spending 
allocation varies by category. Areas that are more consistently low priority according to PEW 
polls are included in Panel A, while Panel B includes areas that are more frequently identified as 
high priority (high and low priority areas are described in Table 3). The results in Panel A 
suggest that more transparent states allocate less of their expenditures to areas of low priority. 
This is especially true for Transportation spending, which is never designated as high priority, 
and Public Works and Housing spending, which is only identified as high priority once between 
2010 and 2016. The results in Panel B are more mixed. In Columns (1) through (3), the 
coefficient for Healthcare is positive and significant, but the coefficients on Education and 
Public Assistance are negative or insignificant.  
An important caveat related to my measures of responsiveness is that PEW polls are 
measured at a national level. It could be that any given individual state (or party within a state) 
varies from national priorities and therefore my results may be subject to some measurement 
bias. I am unable to gather polls at the state level for all states, especially in a way that could be 
converted to a consistent designation of priorities. The national polls do take into consideration 
voters from across the country and therefore should overall capture voter priorities. 
Overall, Tables 5 and 6 combined support that increased levels of transparency are 
associated with better expenditure responsiveness.  
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4.3 Transparency and Selective Responsiveness 
To assess the relation of transparency and selective responsiveness, I first examine the 
relation between state transparency effort and selective expenditure responsiveness by again 
using Equation (2) from above. To assess whether more transparent states are more responsive to 
only select voters, I partition my sample based on voter priorities by political party (as opposed 
to the voter consensus priorities used in Table 5 discussed above). Using the political party of the 
governor in state i and year t as a proxy for the political majority in the state, I separate the 
sample to test the difference in allocation in comparison to “own party priorities” (i.e., Democrat 
led states and Democrat voter priorities) and “other party priorities” (i.e., Democrat led states 
and Republican voter priorities). See details on voter priorities in Table 3.  
Table 7 presents the regression results for Equation (2) examining if states with greater 
transparency effort are associated with expenditure allocation more responsive to selective voter 
priorities. Panel A details the responsiveness of states to the priorities of voters of the same party 
as the current governor, while Panel B presents responsiveness to the priorities of voters from the 
opposing party.24 Evidence of selective responsiveness would be noted in the differences 
between 𝛽 when considering the priorities of the perceived majority of voters (one’s own party) 
versus the minority (the opposing party). The results in Table 7 suggest that transparent states 
exhibit greater responsiveness to their own voters.25 
The coefficient on Implemented in columns (1) and (4) are not significant in both panels, 
indicating that the existence of a transparency initiative is not significantly associated with my 
                                                 
 
24 While states can vary in partisanship, I opt to use the political party of the Governor as an indicator of the political 
lean of the state during that time period. 
25 Note that the priorities of Republicans and Democrats are not mutually exclusive, with some areas consistently 
high or low priority for both groups. 
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measure of responsiveness. The coefficients on PIRG Score in column (2) and (5) are only 
significant for the priorities of opposing parties in Panel B, showing that there is some 
attentiveness to priorities outside of the perceived voting majority. 
Results for the categorical measures of transparency, Leading and Middling suggest that 
leading states display the greatest allocation of spending to areas of high own-party priority. The 
positive and significant coefficients on Leading suggest that, relative to failing states, those states 
assessed as the most transparent allocate more of general expenditure to those areas of highest 
priority to perceived majority voters. Middling is also positive (negative) and significant for 
spending categories of high (low) priority.  
While the results in Table 7 give some evidence of selective responsiveness, it is difficult 
to completely separate out voter priorities as they can often overlap. For example, education is a 
consistently high priority for both Republicans and Democrats across the sample period. 
Therefore, I consider an alternative approach to considering selective responsiveness. As noted 
earlier, there is literature suggesting that transparency motivates short-termism or “you-get-what-
you-measure” phenomena if decision-makers are accountable for their more visible and 
transparent actions but not for the performance consequences of all their decisions. In this spirit, 
I use solvency measures as leading indicators of the adverse consequences of short-termism and 
selective accountability. In particular, I estimate the following regression: 
 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  +  ℎ𝑗,𝑡  +  𝑗,𝑡 (3) 
where 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡 is one of three measures previously identified in the public policy literature 
for state i in year t: Net Asset Ratio, Long-Term Liability Ratio, and TIA Surplus per Capita. The 
independent variable of interest, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡, the vector of state level controls, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, and the 
BEA region-year fixed effects, ℎ𝑗,𝑡, are unchanged from previous regressions.  
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Table 8 presents the regression results for Equation (3) examining if states that engage in 
transparency experience lower levels of solvency. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽. A negative 𝛽 
coefficient (i.e., a greater proportion of long-term liabilities to total assets) indicates greater 
solvency for Long-Term Liability Ratio.  A positive 𝛽 coefficient (i.e., a greater proportion of net 
assets to total assets or a higher surplus) indicates greater solvency for Net Asset Ratio and TIA 
Surplus per Capita. 
The coefficient on Implemented in columns (1), (4), and (7) are all negative, but only 
significant for the measure of TIA Surplus per Capita. This result indicates that the existence of a 
transparency initiative is insufficient to impact state solvency. The coefficients on PIRG Score in 
columns (2), (5), and (8) indicate that states with greater levels of transparency also have lower 
levels of solvency. Similar to measures of efficiency, the movement in ratios are in basis points, 
but these changes are still linked to economically significant amounts given the size of state 
balance sheets. For example, the -0.0032 decrease in net asset ratio associated with a one point 
change in PIRG Score would require nearly a $139.6M reduction in net assets holding total 
assets constant at the mean. Similarly, each point increase in transparency is associated with a 
$134.40 reduction in the state surplus per capita.  
Results for the categorical measures of transparency, Leading and Middling, are 
presented in columns (3), (6), and (9). The significant coefficients on Leading for all three 
measures of solvency suggest that, relative to failing states, those states assessed as the most 
transparent have the lowest levels of solvency. Middling is also associated with worse solvency 
for all three measures, but only significant for TIA Surplus per Capita. For example, column (9) 
shows evidence that a Leading state is associated with an additional $8,009 of deficit per citizen 
compared to those states with less than passing levels of transparency. Middling states also fair 
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worse on deficit per capita, with an additional $5,509 of deficit compared to states below passing 
effort.  
Overall, Tables 7 and 8 support that increased levels of transparency are associated with 
selective responsiveness. 
4.4 Main Sample Robustness 
In addition to the main specifications discussed above, I address other possible concerns 
with additional tests on my main state government sample. 
4.4.1 Changes Specification 
 State policy decisions, including those related to transparency initiatives, are not made in 
a vacuum. While each state may have a different triggering event or motivation for the 
implementation of a transparency program, there is the potential that transparency efforts are 
related to the underlying economics of the states or capture some other state characteristic. I 
therefore reassess Equations 1 through 3 using a changes specification. Changes in transparency 
are captured as the percent change in PIRG Score from year t-1 to year t (% Change in PIRG 
Score), as well as the interaction of this change and the state being a leading state (% Change in 
PIRG Score*Leading).  
A vector of state level controls are represented by  𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑡. Δ Total Assets captures the 
change in total assets of the state and Δ Population is the change in the state's total population in 
a given year. ΔPersonal Income captures the change in income of state residents and is a measure 
of the economic well-being of a state's residents. Where the interaction term % Change in PIRG 
Score*Leading is tested, Leading and % Change in PIRG Score are included in the controls. 
Table 9 presents the results of this alternative change-based approach. Panel A includes 
results for changes in measures of efficiency, as well as tests of responsiveness. The results 
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indicate that changes in PIRG score are significantly associated with changes in expenditure 
efficiency, more consistently for Leading states. Column (6) shows evidence that responsiveness 
is also consistent in the changes regression, but only for reductions in low priority spending.  
Panel B includes results for selective responsiveness. Similar to responsiveness tested in 
Panel A, a change in PIRG score is shown in columns (1) and (2) to only be associated with 
reductions in spending on low priority categories for the opposing party. Columns (5) and (6) 
show results for changes in solvency measures. In untabulated results, the association between 
changes in transparency and changes in solvency are not significant for Changes in Net Asset 
Ratio and Changes in TIA Surplus per Capita. 
Overall, Table 9 presents evidence that states with increasing levels of transparency enjoy 
increased expenditure efficiency and increased responsiveness, and show some evidence of 
selective responsiveness. 
4.4.2 Alternative Measure of State Performance 
A key assumption throughout the paper is that I have appropriately identified measures of 
state performance: efficiency and responsiveness. I therefore consider an alternative measure of 
state performance: stewardship. The use of stewardship, in lieu of overall performance, allows 
for a more targeted focus on the management of resources as opposed to the actual allocation of 
resources. Following Cuny et al (2020), I use audit outcomes as a measure of stewardship, 
though limiting my measures to the presence of unmodified audit opinions, material weaknesses, 
and significant deficiencies. To assess this alternative performance measure, I use the following 
regression: 
 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  + ℎ𝑗,𝑡  +  𝑗,𝑡 (4) 
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where 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑖𝑡 is one of the three audit outcome listed above. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡, again 
captures one of three types of transparency measures for state i in year t. A vector of state level 
controls are again represented by 𝑋𝑖,𝑡. Total Assets captures the assets of the state for that year, 
Population is the state's total population in a given year, and Personal Income captures the total 
income of state residents and is a measure of the economic well-being of a state's residents. 
Republican is an indicator as to whether the current governor in a state is a Republican or not. 
State population demographic controls are not included as there is no expenditure allocation to 
consider. 
 Table 10 presents the regression results for Equation (4) examining if states that engage 
in transparency experience higher levels of stewardship. Results are only significant for 
unmodified opinions, with increased transparency significantly associated with the occurrence of 
an unmodified audit opinion. In untabulated results, Passing states do exhibit a significantly 
negative association with the occurrence of material weaknesses. Additionally, when run in an 
untabulated logit model, being a leading state is still significantly positively associated with the 
likelihood of receiving an unmodified opinion, as well as significantly negatively associated with 
the likelihood of receiving a reportable condition or material weakness. Overall, Table 10 
presents some evidence that transparency initiative efforts are positively associated with 
increased stewardship. 
4.4.3 Reverse Causality 
A key consideration in my study is that states select into being transparent and with that 
there is the concern of selection bias, and more specifically in my study, the issue of reverse 
causality. A concern is that a more efficient or responsive state could opt to be more transparent 
in hopes of some positive benefit from voters becoming more aware of this efficiency or 
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responsiveness. As the decision to implement or improve transparency initiatives are not 
costless, it is fair to assume that states have some expectation of future benefits from these 
efforts. The issue is whether that expectation of benefit is dependent on the state’s existing level 
of efficiency or responsiveness. In other words, do states only expect the benefit (and therefore 
only implement) if they are independently efficient or responsive before deciding to be 
transparent?  
To address this concern I first consider the nature of the state government setting. Each of 
the fifty states chose to implement a transparency initiative, with the majority [36 out of 50 
states] implementing between 2008 and 2010. While there is likely some contagion between 
states from witnessing other states’ successful transparency initiatives, the most frequently cited 
motivation for state transparency initiatives is the federal equivalents passed in 2006 and 2008. 
The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA) and the follow-up 
Strengthening Transparency and Accountability in Federal Spending Act of 2008 were 
bipartisan, sponsored by then Senators Tom Coburn, Barack Obama, Tom Carper, and John 
McCain. Unanimously passed, the federal legislation was focused on the importance of 
informing taxpayers of where their tax dollars were being used.   
States were likely also influenced by the economic crisis and the passage of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, which required states to track federal stimulus 
funds. Nearly all of state transparency initiatives were implemented after the introduction of the 
FFATA [49 out of 50 states implemented after April of 2006], with the majority falling between 
2008 and 2010 [36 out of 50 states] as the ARRA was implemented. Taken together, these 
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national events at least anecdotally suggest that state level transparency initiatives were 
influenced by federal transparency efforts.26 
The influence of federal transparency efforts may alleviate some concern that being 
efficient or responsive is what leads states to implement a transparency initiative. However, the 
existence of federal influences does not completely address the level of transparency effort made 
by each state. It may be that more efficient or responsive states are more incentivized to be 
transparent to better display their superior performance. Or possibly that more efficient states are 
better equipped to be more transparent due to improved systems or processes. It would follow 
then that more efficient or responsive states implementing a transparency initiative should 
exhibit higher transparency scores in their first year of transparency efforts compared to those 
that are less efficient or responsive.  
However, there is not a significant correlation between PIRG Score and Lagged 
Efficiency in the year of transparency initiative implementation. There is a positive correlation of 
0.1672 with a p-value of 0.5073 in the first year of implementation between PIRG Score and 
Lagged Efficiency.27 This result implies that a state with worse efficiency [a higher expenditure 
per GDP] is correlated, albeit not significantly, with a higher first year transparency score. I do 
not find evidence that more efficient states are more transparent when first implementing a 
transparency initiative.  
                                                 
 
26 Further, state efforts were largely bipartisan supported. I hand check the method by which each state implemented 
its transparency initiatives and did not note any overt political motivation behind proposed transparency efforts. This 
largely bipartisan support alleviates concerns that any concentrated political views may impact state performance. 
27 Lagged efficiency is used to avoid any effects of the transparency effort in the first year, as well as to capture any 
anticipatory action. Results are also consistent and insignificant when using Efficiency in time t. 
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A limitation to this correlation check is that the sample only has transparency scores from 
2010 forward, limiting how many of the fifty states had an implementation year of 2010 or later. 
I therefore also test whether more efficient states are more likely to implement transparency 
initiatives earlier.  There is a positive and insignificant correlation between efficiency and 
implementation year, which would mean a state with worse efficiency is correlated, albeit not 
significantly, with a later transparency implementation. Further, in untabulated results, I estimate 
a logistic regression to see if Lagged Efficiency is a determinant of implementation year. I find 
that prior year efficiency is not a significant determinant of implementation year across the larger 
2006-2016 sample. This is true using a continuous measure of efficiency as well as indicator 
variables for being above the sample mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile in a given year.28 
Taken together with the above correlations in the smaller sample, these insignificant correlations 
and results give some reassurance that it is not simply that more efficient states are opting to be 
more transparent. 
The above helps to address the concern that already efficient states are driving my results. 
However, it could still be that states with existing solvency concerns are more likely to be 
transparent. If a state has or is developing issues with solvency, it could be that the state chooses 
to disclose more due to some concern of being punished by voters for negative news, congruent 
with the idea in private markets that firms voluntarily disclose bad news (Skinner 1994). To 
alleviate this concern, I follow a similar process to the tests discussed above, but using measures 
of solvency instead of efficiency. I do not find a significant correlation between Lagged Solvency 
and PIRG Score in initiation year, nor a significant correlation between Lagged Solvency and 
                                                 
 
28 In addition, results hold whether efficiency measures are run alone or with a variety of control variables.  
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initiation year. I also do not find that Lagged Solvency is a significant determinant of initiation 
year. These insignificant correlations and results give some reassurance that my results are not 
driven by less solvent states opting to be more transparent.  
It is difficult to fully address the issue of reverse causality further within my research 
design given the nature of the setting. It would be ideal to have some exogenous variation in 
transparency levels to assess how state performance varies in response. However, as 
transparency efforts are decided upon by the individual states, this type of exogenous variation is 
not plausible in my setting. Another possibility would be some identifiable exogenous variation 
in efficiency or responsiveness to see if states then respond by adjusting their transparency 
efforts, thereby confirming concerns of reverse causality. However, I was unable to identify such 
a true shock to either efficiency or responsiveness in my time period.29  
The final consideration then is whether the concern of reverse causality takes away from 
the interest of the relation between transparency and state performance.  The motivation of this 
study is that greater state government spending transparency fosters more public accountability. 
The appeal of this relation is that taxpayers want to know how their money is being spent and 
increased transparency not only gives the public the ability to monitor government, but also the 
act of being more transparent is associated with improved performance. Whether more 
transparent states are more efficient or more efficient states are more transparent, it is still 
possible for taxpayers to identify those higher performing states. Further, if the public were to 
push governments resistant to improving transparency, then those opting to hide poorer 
                                                 
 
29 The COVID-19 pandemic would arguably be such a shock as state budgets were greatly affected unexpectedly in 
2020, but transparency effects are not yet visible. I also considered possible natural disasters that would negatively 
impact state expenditures or exports and therefore would be likely to negatively impact at least efficiency. Such 
incidents I was able to identify did not have a significant impact on efficiency. 
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performance with opacity would be exposed. Overall, my results provide evidence that states 
with greater transparency are higher performers with respect to efficiency and responsiveness. 
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Chapter 5 Alternative Sample and Setting 
 
To address concerns about the viability of the PIRG based transparency measures, as well 
as the size of the state-based sample, I use an alternative sample as a robustness check of my 
results. The Sunshine Review was a budget and fiscal transparency initiative from 2009-2012 
that worked to assess county level transparency websites. The non-profit assessed every county's 
transparency efforts in the United States in 2009 and performed a follow up of the five largest 
counties in each state in 2012. The assessment was a simple checklist of whether counties made 
specific information available online to the public (budget information, financial meeting 
minutes, audit information, tax information, etc.). Based on the availability and completeness of 
the information, each county was assessed a grade between A+ and F. 
I hand collect the results of these county level assessments from web archives of the 
Sunshine Review.30 I split counties into levels similar to those used for the state sample: Leading 
for counties who receive a B or higher and Passing for counties who receive a C or higher. I 
calculate SR Score as the GPA conversion of the letter grades assessed by the Sunshine Review. 
I do not include a binary measure as there is not enough detail to assess the difference between 
counties with no transparency efforts and those that simply fail in their efforts. 
                                                 
 
30 I use the tool web.archive.org as the Sunshine Review was acquired by Ballotpedia in 2014 and the original 
website was dismantled. Ballotpedia has a copy of the Sunshine Review outcomes, but I found that this version is 
incomplete for all counties. 
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County level financial data can be difficult to acquire and is often inconsistent in its 
availability, limiting my ability to replicate all of the tests done for the state-level sample. 
However, the Federal Audit Clearinghouse makes available county level audit data, as well as 
the extent of federal grant expenditures by counties. Combined with county level GDP data from 
the BEA, I am able to assess expenditure efficiency and stewardship at the county level. 
Table 11 includes the summary statistics for this alternate sample. The sample is limited 
to counties where both an audit report was available from the Audit Clearinghouse and an 
assessment was performed by the Sunshine Review in 2009.  
To reassess the relation of transparency and efficiency in this alternate sample, I use the 
following regression: 
 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑔𝑠  +  ℎ𝑡  +  𝑠,𝑡 (5) 
where 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡 is Federal Grant Expenditure as % of GDP. As county level data is more 
limited, I assess the efficiency of federal grant expenditure per county GDP as an equivalent 
efficiency measure. The independent variable of interest, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡, captures one of two 
types of transparency measures for state i in year t. The first is the continuous measure SR Score, 
while the second are categorical variables that partition transparency initiatives based on efforts 
(Passing and Leading). As consistent county data is not available, I utilize both state fixed 
effects and year fixed effects to help control for county characteristics. While this likely throws 
out some of the proverbial baby with the bathwater (a significant concern in my state sample) the 
increased sample size offered at the county level likely alleviates this concern. 
Table 12 presents the regression results for Equation (5) examining if counties that 
engage in transparency experience higher levels of efficiency. The results suggest that more 
transparent counties are more efficient in their federal grant expenditure, consistent with the 
 40 
state-level results. Column (1) and (2) show that being a Leading or Passing county is associated 
with a 0.370 or 0.304 percentage point improvement in expenditure efficiency. As the mean 
federal grant expenditure efficiency is 0.6285% for the sample of counties, these differences 
would mean an economically significant change in expenditure or GDP.  
In addition to efficiency, I also assess how transparency at the county level impacts 
stewardship as captured by county level audit outcomes. I use the following regression: 
 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑔𝑠  +  ℎ𝑡  +  𝑠,𝑡 (6) 
where 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑖𝑡 is one of three audit outcomes. The controls and fixed effects follow 
those detailed in Equation (5) above. The results are presented in Table 13. I report a positive 
and significant relation between three measures of transparency effort and the occurrence of an 
unmodified opinion, as evidenced in columns (1) through (3). Higher levels of transparency 
effort are also negatively and significantly associated with the likelihood of significant 
deficiencies and material weaknesses as shown in columns (4) through (6) and (7) through (9), 
respectively. These results are arguably stronger than those of the equivalent state-sample. The 
stronger results are likely influenced by the greater variation in county level audit procedures and 
resulting outcomes, as well as the larger sample. 
The collective evidence in Tables 12 and 13 suggest that more transparent counties are 
more efficient in their federal grant expenditure and display greater stewardship, in line with 
results from the main state sample that increased transparency is associated with improved 
measures of state performance. Data on county level solvency is not available, making it difficult 
to assess the potential pitfalls of transparency in this county setting. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
The rising popularity of transparency as a tool for good governance is predicated on the 
promise of increased accountability, and with that improved performance. Using spending 
transparency initiatives implemented by state governments over the last decade, I find evidence 
of transparency’s promise for state performance. In particular, I find that transparent states are 
(1) more efficient with expenditures in the sense that they spend less per capita and as a 
percentage of GDP, and (2) more responsive to voters in the sense that their expenditures are 
allocated more towards voter priorities.  
However, transparency is not without pitfalls. Increased focus on measured outputs, 
immediate constituent needs, or the priorities of the most vocal voters has consequences. For 
instance, I find that transparent states’ responsiveness is selective, based on party affiliation (e.g., 
Democrat-led states are more responsive to Democratic voter priorities). I also find that 
transparent states have lower net asset ratios, higher long-term liability ratios, and are less able to 
cover their pension obligations than their less transparent counterparts. These results suggest that 
transparent states forego long-term health and solvency in favor of current performance. Results 
for both the promise and pitfalls of transparency are robust across multiple measures of each 
outcome of interest, as well as an alternate county-level government setting. 
Overall, my findings contribute to several literatures that analyze the importance of 
transparency as a tool for good governance. For instance, I contribute to the literature on the 
influence of disclosure on short-termism (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal 2005; Brochet, 
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Loumioti, & Serafeim 2015; Ernstberger et al. 2017) by showing transparent states shortchange 
long-term success even absent overt short-term stakeholders. My findings also contribute to the 
political science and public policy literatures concerned specifically with the effectiveness of 
transparency in government. Finally, my results are likely to be of interest to politicians and 
public servants considering the implementation or improvement of transparency initiatives, as 
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Total Assets (in millions) Total level of assets for a state in year t, in millions. Urban Institute & US Census 
Bureau 
Population (in thousands) Total level of population for a state in year t, in thousands. Urban Institute & US Census 
Bureau 
Personal Income (in millions) Total level of personal income for a state in year t, in millions. 
Personal income is the total income of the population of the state. 
Urban Institute & US Census 
Bureau 
% School Aged Percent of the state's population that is school aged (5-18) in year t. US Census Bureau 
% 65 and Over Percent of the state's population that is aged 65 and over in year t. US Census Bureau 
% Below Poverty Percent of the state's population that is below the poverty line in 
year t. 
US Census Bureau 
Total Revenue (in millions) Total revenue for a state in year t, in millions. Urban Institute & US Census 
Bureau 
Total Debt (in millions) Total level of debt for a state in year t, in millions. Urban Institute & US Census 
Bureau 
Republican Governor Binary variable that captures the political lean of the current 
serving governor in the state. A Republic governor is captured with 
a one (1), with Democrat or Independent governors captured as a 
zero (0). 
Hand Collected 














Total Expenditure (in millions) Total state expenditure in year t, in millions. Urban Institute & US Census 
Bureau 
Expenditure as % of GDP Total state expenditure as a percent of state-level GDP in year t. Calculated 
Expenditure as % of Income Total state expenditure as a percent of state-level personal income 
in year t. 
Calculated 
Expenditure per Capita Total state expenditure over state population in year t. Calculated 
Education Total state-level spending on Education as a percent of general 
expenditure in year t. 
Urban Institute & US Census 
Bureau 
Public Assistance Total state-level spending on Public Assistance as a percent of 
general expenditure in year t. 
Urban Institute & US Census 
Bureau 
Healthcare Ratio Total state-level spending on Healthcare and Hospitals as a percent 
of general expenditure in year t. 
Urban Institute & US Census 
Bureau 
Public Safety Ratio Total state-level spending on Public Safety as a percent of general 
expenditure in year t. 
Urban Institute & US Census 
Bureau 
Transportation Ratio Total state-level spending on Transportation as a percent of general 
expenditure in year t. 
Urban Institute & US Census 
Bureau 
Public Works & Housing  Ratio Total state-level spending on Public Works and Housing as a 
percent of general expenditure in year t. 








Net Asset Ratio Restricted and unrestricted net assets over total state assets in year 
t. A higher ratio indicates greater long-run solvency. 
Mercatus Center 
Long-Term Liability Ratio Long-term (noncurrent liabilities over state population in year t. A 
lower value indicates greater long-run solvency. 
Mercatus Center 
TIA Surplus per Capita Truth in Accounting calculates a measure of state surpluses and 
deficits based on assets available to pay bills versus accumulated 
bills. Assets available to pay bills are total assets less capital assets 
and restricted assets. Total bills include bonds, other liabilities, 
unfunded pension liabilities, and unfunded retiree healthcare 
benefits, less debt related to capital assets. The resulting difference 
is the assessed "true"* surplus or deficit of the state. The measure 
is meant to be interpreted as the state's ability to pay its bills.  
               *"True" is the term used by TIA. 











Implemented Binary variable that captures whether a state operated a website on 
state spending transparency at some point during the year t. State 
initiatives are dated by locating the originating legislation or 
gubernatorial order that began the initiative and carbon dating the 
website itself to get a best estimate of when the initiative was 
available to users. Any discrepancies are hand-checked against 
local news articles and historical website name changes. 
Individual state websites & 
Carbon Dating the Web 
PIRG Score Score from 0 to 100 hand collected from “Following the Money” 
reports published by the US Public Interest Research Group & The 
Frontier Group. Each state is assessed on pre-defined criteria as to 
the state spending transparency initiatives implemented by each 
state. Scores are on a scale of 0 to 100 each year. 
Public Interest Research 
Group & Frontier Group 
Leading States who received a score of 80 or above on the PIRG report in a 
given year t. 
Public Interest Research 
Group & Frontier Group 
Middling States who received a score of 50-79 on the PIRG report in a given 
year t. 
Public Interest Research 
Group & Frontier Group 
Passing States who received a score of 50 or above on the PIRG report in a 
given year t. 
Public Interest Research 
Group & Frontier Group 
Lagging States who received a score of 49 or below on the PIRG report in a 
given year t. This includes states with no initiative (a score of 0 on 
the report). 
Public Interest Research 
Group & Frontier Group 
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Appendix B: Sample State Transparency Websites 
Appendix B: Sample State Transparency Websites  





Figure 2: Alaska’s spending transparency website in 2016. 










Figure 4: Washington’s spending transparency website in 2016. 
Between 2010 and 2016, Washington moved from posting only summarized data to a fully searchable checkbook, 




Figure 5: Iowa spending transparency website in 2012. 




Figure 6: Iowa spending transparency website in 2020. 
Note that the website was not archived properly, but the website functionality has been documented as not changing 
since 2016. The past looking data is indicative of what was available in that year (for example, 2012 and 2013 data 
is still not available). In four years, Iowa moved from only providing a pie chart of state spending by category to 





Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for State Government Sample 
This table presents summary statistics for the state government sample. See Section 3 and Appendix A for discussion of variables 
and data sources. 
  
Panel A: 2006-2016 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N Mean Std Dev Q1 Med Q3 
              
State Characteristics:       
   Total Assets (in millions) 550 42,776 47,421 18,410 30,807 42,105 
   Population (in thousands) 550 6,214 6,874 1,830 4,407 6,895 
   Personal Income (in millions) 550 287,131 340,988 70,300 177,874 375,301 
   School Aged 550 0.186 0.0133 0.178 0.186 0.192 
   65 and Over 550 0.139 0.0195 0.129 0.139 0.150 
   Below Poverty 350 0.1366 0.03386 0.11 0.1345 0.16 
   Total Revenue (in millions) 550 39,198 48,363 11,484 26,232 45,157 
   Total Debt (in millions) 550 21,567 28,279 5,927 11,106 24,603 
   Republican Governor 550 0.538 0.499 0 1 1 
       
State Expenditure:       
   Total Expenditure (in millions) 550 38,402 46,136 11,320 26,922 44,482 
   Expenditure as % of GDP 550 13.48 3.191 11.01 12.90 15.39 
   Expenditure per Capita 550 6,564 1,966 5,318 6,229 7,273 
   % of Exp by Category       
      Education 550 19.33 4.384 15.95 19.18 22.35 
      Public Assistance 550 29.73 5.695 25.88 30.08 33.30 
      Healthcare 550 7.159 2.854 5.168 7.091 9.255 
      Public Safety 550 3.975 1.006 3.205 3.927 4.607 
      Transportation 550 7.528 2.939 5.529 7.000 8.816 
      Public Works & Housing 550 3.207 1.792 2.229 2.790 3.657 
       
State Long Run Solvency:       
   Net Asset Ratio 550 0.0183 0.449 -0.0500 0.0800 0.230 
   Long-Term Liability Ratio 550 0.400 0.453 0.170 0.280 0.460 
   TIA Surplus per Capita 400 -9,005 15,017 -15,200 -7,050 -2,100 
       
State Audit Outcomes:       
   Unmodified Opinion 519 0.942 0.234 1 1 1 
   Reportable Condition 519 0.798 0.402 1 1 1 
   Material Weakness 519 0.576 0.495 0 1 1 
       
Transparency:       
   Implemented Initiative 550 0.702 0.458 0 1 1 
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Panel B: 2010-2016 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N Mean Std Dev Q1 Med Q3 
              
State Characteristics:       
   Total Assets (in millions) 350 43,617 48,848 18,832 30,680 42,261 
   Population (in thousands) 350 6,312 7,010 1,842 4,491 6,968 
   Personal Income (in millions) 350 294,883 352,320 72,215 180,472 382,241 
   School Aged 350 0.183 0.0134 0.174 0.183 0.190 
   65 and Over 350 0.144 0.0188 0.135 0.145 0.155 
   Below Poverty 350 0.137 0.0339 0.110 0.135 0.160 
   Total Revenue (in millions) 350 43,076 52,332 13,418 28,954 49,886 
   Total Debt (in millions) 350 22,860 30,071 6,166 13,324 27,786 
   Republican Governor 350 0.577 0.495 0 1 1 
       
State Expenditure:       
   Total Expenditure (in millions) 350 41,030 48,937 12,360 29,067 46,238 
   Expenditure as % of GDP 350 13.72 3.251 11.43 13.13 15.43 
   Expenditure per Capita 350 6,940 2,012 5,616 6,683 7,699 
   % of Exp by Category       
      Education 350 19.07 4.268 15.87 18.74 22.02 
      Public Assistance 350 30.44 5.841 26.48 30.85 34.19 
      Healthcare 350 7.111 2.983 4.920 6.959 9.294 
      Public Safety 350 3.754 0.879 3.091 3.726 4.349 
      Transportation 350 7.216 2.964 5.190 6.719 8.406 
      Public Works & Housing 350 3.034 1.552 2.091 2.680 3.597 
       
State Long Run Solvency:       
   Net Asset Ratio 350 -0.0346 0.518 -0.0900 0.0550 0.220 
   Long-Term Liability Ratio 350 0.453 0.525 0.190 0.330 0.510 
   TIA Surplus per Capita 350 -8,984 15,606 -15,400 -7,050 -1,900 
       
State Audit Outcomes:       
   Unmodified Opinion 335 0.958 0.200 1 1 1 
   Reportable Condition 335 0.752 0.432 1 1 1 
   Material Weakness 335 0.612 0.488 0 1 1 
       
Transparency:       
   Implemented Initiative 350 0.949 0.221 1 1 1 
   PIRG Score [Out of 100] 350 70.09 24.05 62 77 86.50 
      Passing State 350 0.866 0.341 1 1 1 
      Leading State 350 0.423 0.495 0 0 1 
      Middling State 350 0.437 0.497 0 0 1 
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Table 2: Transparency Initiative Adoption 
This table details the year a new transparency initiative was implemented at each of the 50 states. Columns (2) through (4) detail 
what percent years 2010-2016 the state was considered a leading, middling, or lagging state according to PIRG Reporting. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Implemented Leading Middling Lagging 
   Alabama 2009 0.000 1.000 0.000 
   Alaska 2008 0.000 0.571 0.429 
   Arizona 2010 0.857 0.000 0.143 
   Arkansas 2012 0.429 0.143 0.143 
   California 2009 0.000 0.429 0.571 
   Colorado 2009 0.429 0.571 0.000 
   Connecticut 2011 0.571 0.143 0.143 
   Delaware 2009 0.143 0.857 0.000 
   Florida 2009 0.571 0.429 0.000 
   Georgia 2008 0.000 1.000 0.000 
   Hawaii 2006 0.000 0.857 0.143 
   Idaho 2013 0.000 0.143 0.429 
   Illinois 2009 0.857 0.143 0.000 
   Indiana 2010 0.714 0.143 0.143 
   Iowa 2012 0.571 0.000 0.143 
   Kansas 2008 0.286 0.714 0.000 
   Kentucky 2009 1.000 0.000 0.000 
   Louisiana 2009 0.714 0.286 0.000 
   Maine 2013 0.000 0.714 0.000 
   Maryland 2009 0.429 0.571 0.000 
   Massachusetts 2011 0.857 0.000 0.000 
   Michigan 2010 0.714 0.143 0.143 
   Minnesota 2009 0.429 0.571 0.000 
   Mississippi 1999 0.143 0.857 0.000 
   Missouri 2008 0.143 0.857 0.000 
   Montana 2013 0.429 0.143 0.000 
   Nebraska 2010 0.714 0.286 0.000 
   Nevada 2008 0.143 0.857 0.000 
   New Hampshire 2010 0.143 0.571 0.286 
   New Jersey 2010 0.286 0.571 0.143 
   New Mexico 2011 0.000 1.000 0.000 
   New York 2008 0.571 0.429 0.000 
   North Carolina 2009 0.714 0.286 0.000 
   North Dakota 2011 0.000 0.571 0.286 
   Ohio 2009 0.571 0.429 0.000 
   Oklahoma 2007 0.571 0.429 0.000 
   Oregon 2010 0.857 0.143 0.000 
   Pennsylvania 2008 0.857 0.143 0.000 
   Rhode Island 2009 0.143 0.857 0.000 
   South Carolina 2009 0.000 1.000 0.000 
   South Dakota 2008 0.571 0.286 0.143 
   Tennessee 2009 0.429 0.571 0.000 
   Texas 2008 1.000 0.000 0.000 
   Utah 2009 0.714 0.286 0.000 
   Vermont 2008 0.429 0.429 0.143 
   Virginia 2006 0.714 0.286 0.000 
   Washington 2008 0.714 0.000 0.286 
   West Virginia 2011 0.286 0.429 0.143 
   Wisconsin 2010 0.429 0.286 0.286 
   Wyoming 2009 0.000 0.714 0.286 
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Table 3: Constituent Priorities by Year and Political Preference 
This table details the extent to which an issue is a high priority to voters as reported in annual PEW Polls. Column (1) details the 
ratio of years in which over 50% of individuals polled deemed each issue as a "top priority." Columns (2) and (3) are by political 
party. See Section 3 and Appendix A for discussion of variables and data sources. 
 
Panel A: 2006-2016    
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Majority Republican Democrat 
        
Transportation    
   Roads & Infrastructure 0.000 0.000 0.091 
    
Public Works & Housing    
   Energy Sources 0.455 0.364 0.727 
    
Public Assistance    
   Helping the Poor 0.909 0.000 1.000 
    
Healthcare    
   Healthcare Access/Cost 1.000 0.545 1.000 
    
Education    
   Education 1.000 0.818 1.000 
    
Public Safety    
   Crime 0.636 0.455 0.818 
        
Panel B: 2010-2016    
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Majority Republican Democrat 
        
Transportation    
   Roads & Infrastructure 0.000 0.000 0.143 
    
Public Works & Housing    
   Energy Sources 0.143 0.143 0.571 
    
Public Assistance    
   Helping the Poor 0.857 0.000 1.000 
    
Healthcare    
   Healthcare Access/Cost 1.000 0.429 1.000 
    
Education    
   Education 1.000 0.857 1.000 
    
Public Safety    
   Crime 0.571 0.429 0.857 
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Table 4: Transparency and Expenditure Efficiency 
This table presents results for the relation of transparency and state expenditure efficiency. Measures of efficiency include 
expenditure as a percent of GDP and state expenditures per capita. Transparency is captured as a binary variable (Implemented), 
a continuous variable from 0-100 (PIRG Score), and as categorical variables that split transparency efforts into different 
thresholds (Leading and Middling). Fixed effects are at the BEA region-year. Standard errors are clustered at the BEA region and 
year. See Section 3 and Appendix A for discussion of variables and data sources. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Expenditure as % of GDP Expenditure per Capita 
              
Implemented -0.143   -278.3   
 (-0.345)   (-1.594)   
PIRG Score  -0.0267***   -16.57***  
  (-3.461)   (-3.143)  
Leading   -1.946***   -1,332*** 
   (-2.727)   (-3.049) 
Middling   -0.884   -923.8** 
   (-1.287)   (-2.295) 
Population -1.155*** -1.096*** -1.102***    
 (-5.577) (-4.775) (-4.599)    
Total Assets 0.0479*** 0.0487*** 0.0495*** 24.01*** 24.13*** 24.16*** 
 (7.424) (6.334) (6.497) (4.636) (4.047) (4.064) 
Personal Income 0.0133*** 0.0118*** 0.0119*** -4.447*** -4.576*** -4.600*** 
 (3.675) (3.112) (2.930) (-9.699) (-8.478) (-8.422) 
Republican -0.0644 -0.584* -0.625** 4.731 -103.3 -92.01 
 (-0.268) (-1.908) (-2.080) (0.0309) (-0.522) (-0.492) 
Over 65 35.34** 27.08 30.19 -66,345*** -77,650*** -77,714*** 
 (2.369) (1.435) (1.525) (-7.017) (-6.974) (-7.172) 
School Aged 7.378 1.286 4.276 -79,934*** -95,180*** -95,970*** 
 (0.374) (0.0548) (0.172) (-10.13) (-10.51) (-10.55) 
Below Poverty 0.453*** 0.442*** 0.427*** 103.8*** 116.3*** 113.5*** 
 (10.67) (8.135) (8.166) (4.367) (3.838) (3.780) 
Constant 2.681 7.063 5.613 29,694*** 35,467*** 35,469*** 
 (0.488) (1.039) (0.779) (10.85) (10.51) (10.91) 
       
Observations 550 350 350 550 350 350 
R-squared 0.426 0.459 0.467 0.500 0.515 0.523 
BEA Region-Year 
FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 5: Transparency and Expenditure Allocation Responsiveness 
This table presents results for the relation of transparency and state expenditure allocation responsiveness. Measures of 
expenditure allocation are the percent of spending by Census Bureau spending to general state expenditure. Voter priorities are as 
reported in annual PEW polls. Transparency is captured as a binary variable (Implemented), a continuous variable from 0-100 
(PIRG Score), and as categorical variables that split transparency efforts into different thresholds (Leading and Middling). Fixed 
effects are at the spending category-BEA region-year. Standard errors are clustered at the BEA region and year. See Section 3 
and Appendix A for discussion of variables and data sources. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High Priority Low Priority 
              
Implemented 0.256   -0.170 
  
 (1.262)   (-0.668) 
  








Leading   0.814***   -0.821** 
   (3.033)   (-2.547) 
Middling   0.528**   -0.798*** 
   (2.140)   (-2.877) 
Population 0.460*** 0.435*** 0.420*** -0.00109 -0.0423 -0.0273 
 (6.449) (4.862) (4.734) (-0.00975) (-0.391) (-0.253) 
Total Assets -0.00755** -0.00277 -0.00244 0.0178*** 0.0153*** 0.0147*** 
 (-2.103) (-0.642) (-0.588) (4.166) (3.651) (3.503) 
Personal Income -0.00861*** -0.00819*** -0.00792*** -0.00395* -0.00261 -0.00291 
 (-6.076) (-4.541) (-4.342) (-1.897) (-1.309) (-1.443) 
Republican -0.0500 -0.138 -0.140 0.530*** 0.582*** 0.622*** 
 (-0.430) (-0.888) (-0.908) (3.152) (2.948) (3.122) 
Over 65 38.52*** 51.71*** 51.63*** -9.841 -8.192 -9.952 
 (4.359) (4.435) (4.586) (-1.260) (-0.989) (-1.201) 
School Aged 50.67*** 69.83*** 70.30*** -18.34** -19.62** -23.22** 
 (5.798) (5.809) (5.997) (-2.164) (-2.125) (-2.342) 
Below Poverty 0.0570*** 0.0485* 0.0509* -0.0206 -0.0202 -0.0196 
 (2.826) (1.896) (1.972) (-0.898) (-0.749) (-0.709) 
Constant -1.324 -6.410* -6.378* 11.98*** 12.43*** 13.20*** 
 (-0.483) (-1.764) (-1.848) (4.722) (4.600) (4.640) 
       
Observations 2,200 1,250 1,250 1,100 850 850 




YES YES YES YES YES YES 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 6: Transparency and Expenditure Allocation 
This table presents results for the relation of transparency and state expenditure allocation responsiveness. Measures of expenditure allocation are the percent of spending by 
Census Bureau spending to general state expenditure. Transparency is captured as a binary variable (Implemented), a continuous variable from 0-100 (PIRG Score), and as 
categorical variables that split transparency efforts into different thresholds (Leading and Middling). Fixed effects are at the BEA region-year. Standard errors are clustered at the 
BEA region and year. See Section 3 and Appendix A for discussion of variables and data sources. 
 
Panel A: Areas of Consistently Low Voter Priority 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Transportation Public Works and Housing Public Safety 
                 
Implemented -0.337   -0.731***   -0.0825   
 (-0.953)   (-3.608)   (-0.483)   
PIRG Score  -0.0199***   -0.0121***   -0.00480*  
  (-3.095)   (-3.470)   (-1.899)  
Leading   -1.305**   -1.015***   -0.370* 
   (-2.444)   (-4.076)   (-1.931) 
Middling   -1.639***   -1.100***   -0.366* 
   (-3.687)   (-4.917)   (-1.990) 
            
Observations 550 350 350 550 350 350 550 350 350 
R-squared 0.467 0.494 0.501 0.331 0.490 0.507 0.376 0.299 0.303 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BEA Region-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




Panel B: Areas of Consistently High Voter Priority 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Healthcare Education Public Assistance 
                 
Implemented 1.359***   -0.936*   -0.0825   
 (2.711)   (-1.737)   (-0.483)   
PIRG Score  0.0324***   0.00539   -0.00480*  
  (4.011)   (0.538)   (-1.899)  
Leading   2.324***   0.590   -0.370* 
   (4.255)   (0.749)   (-1.931) 
Middling   2.277***   0.403   -0.366* 
   (4.121)   (0.498)   (-1.990) 
          
Observations 550 350 350 550 350 350 550 350 350 
R-squared 0.221 0.247 0.253 0.543 0.422 0.422 0.376 0.299 0.303 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BEA Region-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 7: Transparency and Selective Responsiveness 
This table presents results for the relation of transparency and selective state expenditure allocation responsiveness. Measures of 
expenditure allocation are the percent of spending by Census Bureau spending to general state expenditure. Voter priorities are 
partitioned by political party as reported in annual PEW polls. Transparency is captured as a binary variable (Implemented), a 
continuous variable from 0-100 (PIRG Score), and as categorical variables that split transparency efforts into different thresholds 
(Leading and Middling). Fixed effects are at the spending category-BEA region-year. Standard errors are clustered at the BEA 
region and year. See Section 3 and Appendix A for discussion of variables and data sources.  
 
Panel A: Own Party Priorities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High Priority Low Priority 
              
Implemented 0.442   -0.279   
 (1.473)   (-0.937)   
PIRG Score  0.00699   -0.00461  
  (1.659)   (-1.149)  
Leading   0.707**   -0.336 
   (2.195)   (-1.064) 
Middling   0.664**   -0.650** 
   (2.189)   (-2.319) 
       
Observations 1,825 1,057 1,057 1,475 1,043 1,043 
R-squared 0.890 0.887 0.888 0.902 0.911 0.911 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Spending 
Category-Year FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Panel B: Opposing Party Priorities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High Priority Low Priority 
              
Implemented 0.243   0.0810   
 (1.176)   (0.445)   
PIRG Score  0.00562*   -0.00499**  
  (1.676)   (-2.198)  
Leading   0.461*   -0.256 
   (1.804)   (-1.179) 
Middling   -0.00844   -0.0702 
   (-0.0368)   (-0.291) 
       
Observations 1,925 1,193 1,193 1,375 907 907 
R-squared 0.887 0.892 0.892 0.906 0.907 0.907 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Spending 
Category-Year FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 8: Transparency and Solvency 
This table presents results for the relation of transparency and state solvency. Measures of solvency include ratio of net assets to total assets, ratio of long-term liabilities to total 
assets, and per capita surplus or deficit in a state. Transparency is captured as a binary variable (Implemented), a continuous variable from 0-100 (PIRG Score), and as categorical 
variables that split transparency efforts into different thresholds (Leading and Middling). Fixed effects are at the BEA region-year. Standard errors are clustered at the BEA region 
and year. See Section 3 and Appendix A for discussion of variables and data sources.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Net Asset Ratio Long-Term Liability Ratio TIA Surplus per Capita 
                 
Implemented -0.0135   -0.0161   -2,923*   
 (-0.384)   (-0.398)   (-1.679)   
PIRG Score  -0.00316***   0.00267***   -134.4***  
  (-4.045)   (2.684)   (-4.599)  
Leading   -0.203***   0.151**   -8,009*** 
   (-3.693)   (2.327)   (-3.042) 
Middling   -0.0707   0.0317   -5,509** 
   (-1.459)   (0.595)   (-2.098) 
            
Observations 550 350 350 550 350 350 400 350 350 
R-squared 0.578 0.579 0.582 0.500 0.496 0.498 0.560 0.595 0.588 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BEA Region-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




Table 9: Changes in Transparency and State Performance 
This table presents results for the relation of changes in transparency and changes in state performance. Measures of change in performance include changes in expenditure as a 
percent of GDP, state expenditures per capita, percent of spending by Census Bureau spending to general state expenditure, ratio of net assets to total assets, and ratio of long-term 
liabilities to total assets. Changes in transparency are captured as changes in a continuous variable from 0-100 (PIRG Score), as well as those changes interacted with those states 
with leading transparency efforts. Standard errors are clustered at the BEA region and year. See Section 3 and Appendix A for discussion of variables and data sources. 
 
Panel A: Changes in Efficiency and Responsiveness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Change in Exp as % of GDP Change in Exp as % of GDP 
Change in % of Expenditure by 
Category 
 High Priority Low Priority 
        
% Change in PIRG Score -0.00451***  0.000992  -0.00504 -0.0212** 
 (-3.082)  (0.435)  (-0.789) (-2.309) 
% Change in PIRG Score*Leading  -0.00448**  -0.00351**   
  (-2.044)  (-2.244)   
       
Observations 300 300 300 300 1,100 700 
R-squared 0.029 0.014 0.049 0.051 0.004 0.003 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       




Panel B: Changes in Selective Responsiveness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Change in % of Expenditure by Category 
Change in LT Liability Ratio 
 
Own Party High 
Priority 






        
% Change in PIRG Score -0.0140 0.000158 -0.00671 -0.0234*** -0.0182***  
 (-1.356) (0.0369) (-0.870) (-4.304) (-2.954)  
% Change in PIRG Score*Leading      -0.0280** 
      (-2.092) 




903 1,047 897 753 300 300 
R-squared 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.023 0.021 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 10: Transparency and Stewardship 
This table presents results for the relation of transparency and stewardship. Measures of stewardship include the occurrence of unmodified audit opinions, significant deficiencies, 
and material weaknesses. Transparency is captured as a binary variable (Implemented), a continuous variable from 0-100 (PIRG Score), and as categorical variables that split 
transparency efforts into different thresholds (Leading and Middling). Fixed effects are at the BEA region-year. Standard errors are clustered at the BEA region and year. See 
Section 3 and Appendix A for discussion of variables and data sources. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Unmodified Opinion Significant Deficiency Material Weakness 
                 
Implemented 0.0698*   -0.00987   0.135   
 (1.803)   (-0.132)   (1.662)   
PIRG Score  0.000938*   0.00263   -0.00138  
  (2.001)   (1.585)   (-0.873)  
Leading   0.0853**   0.195   -0.0828 
   (2.080)   (1.504)   (-0.767) 
Middling   0.0467   0.135   0.0489 
   (1.106)   (1.151)   (0.464) 
  
 
   
    
 
 
Observations 550 350 350 550 350 350 400 350 350 
R-squared 0.578 0.579 0.582 0.500 0.496 0.498 0.560 0.595 0.588 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BEA Region-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative County Government Sample 
This table presents summary statistics for the alternative government sample. See Appendix A for discussion of variables and data sources. 
 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) 
 N Mean Std Dev Q1 Med Q3 
              
County Characteristics:       
   Federal Expenditure (in thousands) 1,944 30,984 132,092 1,403 4,116 16,022 
   GDP (in millions) 1,944 9,866 30,993 642.0 1,714 6,121 
   Federal Expenditure as % of GDP 1,944 0.6285 1.141 0.100 0.247 0.603 
       
County Audits       
   Unqualified Opinion 1,944 0.866 0.341 1 1 1 
   Going Concern 1,944 0.00617 0.0783 0 0 0 
   Reportable Condition/Significant Deficiency 1,944 0.539 0.499 0 1 1 
   Material Weakness 1,944 0.340 0.474 0 0 1 
   Material Noncompliance 1,944 0.116 0.320 0 0 0 
       
Transparency:       
      Leading County 1,944 0.246 0.431 0 0 0 
      Passing County 1,944 0.451 0.498 0 0 1 
      Failing County 1,944 0.549 0.498 0 1 1 
   GPA [Out of 4.0] 1,944 1.327 1.218 0 1 2 
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Table 12: Transparency and Efficiency in an Alternative Sample 
This table presents results for the relation of transparency and county efficiency. The measure of efficiency is federal grant 
expenditure by counties as a percent of GDP. Transparency is captured as a continuous variable from 0-4.0 (SR Score) and as 
categorical variables that split transparency efforts into different thresholds (Leading and Passing). Fixed effects are at the state-


























***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Federal Grant Expenditure as % of GDP 
    
Leading County -0.370**   
 (-2.459)   
Passing County  -0.304**  
  (-2.366)  
SR Score   -0.149*** 
   (-2.831) 
Constant 0.720*** 0.766*** 0.827*** 
 (19.43) (13.20) (11.81) 
    
Observations 1,944 1,944 1,944 
R-squared 0.613 0.611 0.616 
State FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
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Table 13: Transparency and Stewardship in an Alternative Sample 
This table presents results for the relation of transparency and county stewardship. Measures of stewardship include the occurrence of unmodified audit opinions, significant 
deficiencies, and material weaknesses. Transparency is captured as a continuous variable from 0-4.0 (SR Score) and as categorical variables that split transparency efforts into 
different thresholds (Leading and Passing). Fixed effects are at the state-year. Standard errors are clustered at the BEA region and year. See Appendix A for discussion of variables 
and data sources. 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
          






                    
Leading County 0.0692***   -0.111***    -0.158***   
 (3.483)   (-3.170)    (-4.845)   
Passing County  0.0802***    -0.105***    -0.149***  
  (3.422)    (-3.042)    (-5.112)  
SR Score   0.0390***    -0.0474***   -0.0700*** 
   (3.906)    (-3.280)   (-5.295) 
Constant 0.849*** 0.830*** 0.814*** 0.566*** 0.586*** 0.602*** 0.378*** 0.407*** 0.432*** 
 (173.5) (78.46) (61.41) (65.58) (37.58) (31.34) (47.19) (30.84) (24.64) 
            
Observations 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 
R-squared 0.315 0.319 0.322 0.243 0.244 0.245 0.181 0.184 0.188 
 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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